Abdullah Öcalan is the founder and leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization in Türkiye and many other countries. Öcalan was tried in Türkiye and convicted of various serious crimes.
Main Crimes Established by Court in Türkiye
Attempting to undermine the unity of the state and the territorial integrity of the country
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One of the most serious crimes under the Turkish Penal Code.
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Considered an attempt to seize territory from Türkiye through an armed organization.
Establishing and leading an armed terrorist organization
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As the founder and leader of the PKK, he was held responsible for all activities of the organization.
Planning and ordering actions that caused the deaths of thousands
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Including attacks against civilians, soldiers, and security personnel.
Directing armed rebellion and terrorist activities
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Armed operations carried out within Türkiye and across borders.
Incitement to murder (in numerous cases)
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Not directly, but through orders and instructions given as the leader of the organization.
Responsibility for armed attacks, bombings, and sabotage
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Within the scope of numerous actions carried out by the PKK.
Conducting armed activities against the state (insurrection)
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A prolonged period of armed conflict.
Sentence and Current Status
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Captured in Türkiye in 1999.
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Sentenced to death by the State Security Court.
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After the abolition of the death penalty in Türkiye, the sentence was commuted to aggravated life imprisonment.
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He is currently serving his sentence in İmralı Prison.
Total Loss of Life (1984–Present)
Since the PKK began its armed campaign in Türkiye in 1984:
👉 40,000 – 50,000+ people have lost their lives.
This figure includes not only those killed by the PKK but also PKK members killed in clashes.
Security Personnel Killed in Türkiye
(Turkish Armed Forces, Gendarmerie, Police, village guards)
👉 Approximately 7,000 – 8,000+ personnel
Civilian Casualties
👉 Approximately 5,000 – 6,000+ civilians
These civilians include:
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Victims of village raids
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Victims of bomb attacks
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Teachers, workers, public officials
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Women, the elderly, and children
PKK Member Losses
The majority of total deaths consist of militants killed in clashes:
👉 Approximately 30,000+ PKK members
Major Incidents Known for Child and Infant Deaths
1) Pınarcık (Mardin) Massacre
📍 Location: Pınarcık Village, Ömerli — Mardin
📅 Date: June 20, 1987
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PKK militants carried out a night raid on the village.
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Homes were stormed and civilians were shot.
👉 30 people were killed. -
Most victims were women and children.
👉 16 were children; infants were among them.
This attack is considered one of the PKK assaults in Türkiye with the highest number of child fatalities.
2) Bilge Village Massacre
📍 Location: Bilge Village, Mazıdağı — Mardin
📅 Date: May 4, 2009
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A wedding was attacked and civilians were fired upon.
👉 44 people were killed (including women and children). -
Infants and young children were among the victims.
3) Güçlükonak (Şırnak) Civilian Deaths
📍 Location: Güçlükonak — Şırnak
📅 Date: 1990s (multiple incidents)
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Due to mine placements and attacks in the region
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Civilian vehicles were targeted
👉 Women and children were killed -
Some reports indicated infant fatalities
4) Village Mines and Road Attacks (1980s–1990s)
In rural areas, PKK tactics included:
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Roadside mines
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Targeting civilian minibuses and tractors
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Village raids
These resulted in many child and infant deaths.
👉 Such incidents are generally recorded in aggregate statistics rather than individually.
5) Child Deaths in Urban Bombings
In some city attacks carried out by the PKK or affiliated groups:
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Bus stops
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Marketplaces
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Shopping areas
were targeted, resulting in child and infant casualties. Infant numbers are usually not reported separately.
Ideology and Soviet Connections
The PKK initially emerged as an organization with a Marxist–Leninist ideology.
Was There a Soviet Connection?
During the Cold War, there were indirect links and support.
1) Ideological Influence
The PKK:
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Followed a Marxist–Leninist line
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Used anti-imperialist and socialist rhetoric
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Was therefore ideologically close to the Soviet bloc
2) Training and Shelter in Soviet-Aligned Regions
Some PKK militants trained in:
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Syria (especially the Bekaa Valley)
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Lebanon
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Eastern Bloc countries
👉 The Syrian government (under Hafez al-Assad) provided long-term sanctuary and camps.
👉 This support was largely tied to political tensions between Türkiye and Syria.
3) Allegations of Indirect Military Support
Some weapons used by the PKK were Soviet-made.
Why the Claim That the Soviets Founded the PKK?
This claim is often linked to:
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The PKK’s communist ideology
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The Cold War environment
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Türkiye’s NATO membership
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The idea that the Soviets sought indirect pressure on Türkiye
After the Collapse of the Soviet Union
After 1991:
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The PKK underwent ideological transformation
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Moved away from the goal of a Marxist state
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Adopted new concepts such as “democratic confederalism”
Personal Interpretation
In my view, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, global power balances shifted fundamentally and movements tied to Marxist–Leninist ideology were left without patrons. The PKK under Abdullah Öcalan was directly affected by this transformation. I believe the United States sought to establish greater control over the PKK in line with its new Middle East interests, but Öcalan’s rigid socialist and anti-imperialist stance was seen as difficult to manage. For this reason, I believe he was deliberately left isolated, and that the process beginning with his expulsion from Syria and continuing with his inability to secure long-term refuge ultimately paved the way for his delivery to Türkiye. In my view, his capture in 1999 was not merely an operational success but also a result of changing post-Cold War geopolitical calculations and the implicit preferences of the United States.
I also believe that shortly afterward the world experienced major upheavals: the September 11 attacks occurred, followed by the Iraq War, and the United States established a direct military presence in the Middle East. In this new era, the United States formed much closer and broader alliances with Kurdish groups, operating together on the ground, and over time Soviet-made weapons were replaced by U.S.-made weapons. All of this suggests to me that regional actors and alliances were being reshaped in the post-Cold War period and that Öcalan’s capture was an early stage of this broader transformation.
Furthermore, I think the United States executed a highly calculated tactical and strategic move. In order not to appear antagonistic to Kurdish public opinion, the role of the “bad actor” in Öcalan’s transfer to Türkiye was left to Türkiye, while the United States remained largely invisible. I believe claims that he was handed over with guarantees that he would not be executed also helped keep the U.S. role in the background. In this way, the United States could maintain relations with Türkiye while preserving ties with Kurdish actors and avoiding direct public responsibility.
On the Turkish side, I believe there has long existed within the state a strong anti-American, anti-NATO, nationalist, and ultra-nationalist current, characterized by a deeply skeptical—even hostile—view of the West. What I find notable is that despite their ideological opposition, this current and Öcalan’s anti-imperialist rhetoric may have converged at certain points. In other words, their interests could intersect on the basis of opposition to the United States. For this reason, I believe such elements within the state may also have had an indirect interest in Öcalan not being executed: it allowed Türkiye to retain a strategic bargaining asset without escalating international pressure and without appearing fully aligned with the United States. To me, this illustrates how even ideological adversaries can form implicit alignments in complex geopolitical contexts.
Personal Statement
Today, as a citizen of the Republic of Türkiye of Zaza ethnic origin and Alevi faith, seeing discussions about a “right to hope” concerning Abdullah Öcalan—whom I regard as a terrorist leader, a “baby killer,” and one of the greatest obstacles to the historical friendship between Turks and Kurds—deeply shakes and saddens me, causing profound discomfort and anxiety. These debates create the impression that the suffering and losses endured have not been fully understood, weighing heavily on my conscience. I believe Öcalan is not only responsible for the deaths of Turks or Kurds but for violence directed at innocent people in general; therefore, I see him as a perpetrator of crimes against humanity as a whole. For this reason, hearing hopeful discourse about such a person’s future is emotionally and morally distressing and extremely difficult for me to accept.
Note: I used ChatGPT to help express my feelings without profanity, within respectful boundaries, and in appropriate language.
Personal Note on a Psychological Evaluation
At this point, I would also like to add a psychological perspective on the issue; however, I would like to emphasize from the outset that this is not an academic or clinical analysis. I am a graduate of International Relations from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and I have not received any formal education in psychology or psychiatry. Therefore, the following remarks are not expert opinions but rather amateur observations based on my life experience and personal impressions.
Within this framework, I would like to state that I believe some of the behaviors and statements of Abdullah Öcalan may indicate serious psychological problems. In particular, traits such as a lack of empathy, emotional coldness, and a distant attitude toward the suffering of others remind me of characteristics described in the literature on psychopathy. At times, he appears to display a profile of someone who does not feel emotions adequately or whose emotional responses are extremely limited; I am aware that such emotional detachment is often associated with psychopathy. I express this not as an insult or a derogatory remark, but as a psychological observation, albeit an amateur one. Additionally, I have formed the impression that his rhetoric and self-positioning reflect notable narcissistic personality traits.
Moreover, I believe that the fact that a person held responsible for the deaths of many people in the past is now being portrayed as a “messenger of peace” is a phenomenon that should be examined by professionals not only from a political perspective but also from psychological viewpoints. In my opinion, this situation represents a striking transformation that merits analysis in terms of individual psychology, mass psychology, and political psychology.
On the other hand, the compassion shown toward this individual by certain philosophers and especially some left-leaning thinkers around the world also appears to be a matter worthy of reflection. The humanitarian, ideological, or psychological motivations behind such attitudes seem to constitute a complex issue that should be analyzed within academic circles. From my perspective, sympathy or tolerance toward a figure associated with a large number of deaths is not only a political matter but also one that requires psychological and sociological examination, as it represents an unusual and intellectually challenging situation.
For these reasons, I believe that these attitudes and transformations would be more appropriately evaluated by experts in both individual and social psychology in order to reach sound conclusions.
Utilitarian Double Standard in Politics
One of the situations in Turkish politics today that surprises and deeply disturbs me the most is what I perceive as an attitude shaped not by principles but by utility. Selahattin Demirtaş, a Kurdish politician opposed to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), has been imprisoned for nearly a decade, yet due to his opposition identity, his words are almost entirely ignored in the public sphere, and he is not afforded even the most basic level of human or political respect. In contrast, the statements of a terrorist organization leader held responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of people — whether or not he is granted a “right to hope” — are now discussed within a framework of respect and at times even treated as if they were worthy of reference. This strikes me as profoundly contradictory and strange. The fact that this approach emerges simultaneously with that person adopting a position aligned with or open to cooperation with the government reinforces my impression that politics in Türkiye is conducted not on principle but on a utilitarian basis. In my view, this situation undermines the sense of justice, creates deep fractures in the social conscience, and presents a deeply troubling picture in which the value of words or individuals is determined not by ethical standards but by political expediency.
The ideas and original content in this text belong to me; the English translation was also produced by ChatGPT, which has only provided translation, Turkish spelling, punctuation, and editorial editing support.
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